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INTRODUCTION
When the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Fisher v. Texas,'
scholars and commentators speculated that the Court was set to end
affirmative action in higher education. 2 This outcome seemed even
* Professor of Law, University of South Carolina School of Law. I want to thank my dear
friend, Aderson Frangois, and the Howard Law Journal for extending me the opportunity to
think through Fisher v. Texas more deeply and publish this Essay. I am grateful to my dean, Rob
Wilcox, for supporting this and other research over the past year. Finally, without the continuing
conversations regarding Fisherwith my colleagues, Danielle Holley-Walker and Eboni Nelson, I
may have had nothing to write. Unfortunately, any misdirection in this Essay is still my own.
1. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 132 S. Ct. 1536 (2012).
2. See, e.g., Allen Rostron, Affirmative Action, Justice Kennedy, and the Virtues of the Middle Ground, 107 Nw. U. L. REV. 1037, 1039-40 (2013) (indicating that Justice Kagan's recusal
from Fisherheightened fears that affirmative action would be coming to an end); Gerald Torres,
2014 Vol. 57 No. 2
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more likely given Justice Elena Kagan's recusal.3 Without her, the
best-case scenario required Justice Kennedy to affirmatively side with
the three remaining "liberals." A carefully crafted concurrence by
Justice Kennedy in Fisher, akin to the one he authored in ParentsInvolved in Community Schools v. Seattle,' would have no effect because
the four other conservatives would have a majority over three dissents
without Justice Kennedy. To the surprise of most, however, the final
opinion in Fisher was neither a decisive win for the conservatives, nor
a dramatic four-four split to save affirmative action. Instead, the
Court delivered a dull seven-to-one decision in which the Court allowed Grutter v. Bollinger's' holding-that the educational benefit of
diversity is a compelling interest-to survive,6 but remanded Fisher
with an emphasis to apply a demanding narrow tailoring analysis.'
The only language in Fisher that potentially adds something to
the jurisprudence of higher education admissions is the Court's statement that "[n]arrow tailoring also requires that the reviewing court
verify that it is 'necessary' for a university to use race to achieve the
educational benefits of diversity. This involves a careful judicial inquiry into whether a university could achieve sufficient diversity without using racial classifications."' The question is whether this is
anything more than an emphasis of what the law already is.9 The
Court in Fisher presents the "necessity" requirement as being procedural rather than substantive in nature. The lower courts had been
Fisher v. University of Texas: Living in the Dwindling Shadow of LBJ's America, 65 VAND. L.
REV. EN BANC 97, 101-02 (2012) (discussing fears that Fisherwould reverse the diversity rationale adopted in Grutter v. Bollinger).
3. See Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2422.
4. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 782-98
(2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
5. See Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2419-22 (citing Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003)).
6. See id. at 2419 ("[T]he parties here do not ask the court to revisit that aspect [approving
diversity as a compelling interest] of Grutter's holding."). Justice Thomas concurred separately
to emphasize that overturning Grutter was not before the Court and, thus, the holding is not an
endorsement of Grutter. See id. at 2432 (Thomas, J., concurring). While the Justices are correct
that overturning Grutter was not raised by the parties, the question of whether diversity is a
compelling interest was necessarily bound up in the resolution of this case. If no compelling
interest existed, narrow tailoring would be irrelevant. Likewise, if no compelling interest existed, the Court would be sanctioning what would otherwise be unconstitutional action by the
University. Recognizing this problem, the Court has not hesitated in the past to reach out and
address issues in race cases that were not squarely presented by the parties. See, e.g., Missouri v.
Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 138 (1995) (Souter, J., concurring).
7. See Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2421-22.
8. Id. at 2420.
9. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326 (indicating that government imposition of racial classifications is reviewed under strict scrutiny and is constitutional only if it is narrowly tailored to further compelling governmental interests).

478

[VOL. 57:477

Fisher v. Texas and the Irrelevance of Function

willing to assume the University of Texas's good faith and defer to its
judgment in terms of the necessity of relying on race. The Supreme
Court in Fisher indicated that the lower courts should examine the
evidence on this point themselves rather than deferring to the University.'o The underlying question, however, remains the same after
Fisher: has the university engaged in a "serious, good faith consideration of workable race-neutral alternatives"" and established that "no
workable race-neutral alternatives would produce the educational
benefits of diversity"?' 2
Yet, the term "necessity" in Fisher sounds stricter than Grutter.
Those opposing affirmative action will surely seize on this point to
argue that Fisherraises the bar. But to do so, they will need to ignore
the Fisher Court's quote of Grutter immediately thereafter: "[N]arrow
tailoring does not require exhaustion of every conceivable race-neutral alternative."' For the moment, the final word rests with the federal government, which reads the case as I do. In their recent official
guidance, the Departments of Justice and Education concluded that
Fisher "preserved the well-established legal principle that colleges and
universities have a compelling interest in achieving the educational
benefits that flow from a racially and ethnically diverse student body
and can lawfully pursue that interest in their admissions programs"14
and "did not change the [narrow tailoring] requirements articulated in
Grutter v. Bollinger."" If this reading of Fisher is correct, Fisher is

either unimportant or important for some other reason than having
changed the law.
I posit that Fisher did not change the law, but is, nonetheless,
important for a far more subtle reason: it represents the continuing
triumph of form over function in race cases, which, as a practical matter, works to the serious disadvantage of minorities. By form over
function, I mean that how a program operates and the net results it
produces are of relatively little importance compared to the racial
10. See Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2421.
11. Id. at 2420 (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339-40).
12. Id. ("If 'a nonracial approach ... could promote the substantial interest about as well
and at tolerable administrative expense,' then the university may not consider race.") (quoting
wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 279-80, n.6 (1986)).
13. Id.
14. Jocelyn Samuels & Catherine E. Lhamon, Joint "DearColleague" Letter, U.S. DEP'T OF
JusT. & U.S. DEP'T OF EDUc. (Sept. 27, 2013), http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/
colleague-201309.html.
15. Questions andAnswers About Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, ED.Gov (Sept. 25,
2013), http://www2.ed.gov/aboutloffices/list/ocr/docs/dcl-qa-201309.html.
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forms it employs. A majority of the Court is obsessed with the forms
that racial considerations take. A majority of the Court finds formalistic uses of race extremely objectionable, even if they have very little
real-world impact. At the same time, the Court passes on less obvious
uses of race even though they have huge consequences-typically negative for minorities.
Careful examination of Fisher reveals that the role of form over
function is just below the surface. Comparing the effect that racial
classifications played in the University of Texas's admissions policy to
the effect that race-neutral classifications played brings form over
function into clearer view. First, the University operated a multilevel
admissions process in which the explicit use of race could have only
come into play and been decisive in a small fraction of the total admissions offers extended by the state.16 The functional weight of the use
of race, however, has no effect on the Court's analysis. The Court
indicated the program is only constitutional if the University can produce evidence that race-neutral alternatives are unworkable." Second, the Court did not pause for a moment to critically consider the
far more significant racial impacts's of Texas's Top Ten Percent Plan
because the Plan did not rely on any explicit racial forms or classifications. Per this analysis, a state actor that avoids the use of prohibited
racial forms can bestow any amount of good or harm on minorities
that it wishes without drawing the serious concern of the Court.
In the context of Texas's Plan, this approach might seem fair
enough. The Court scrutinized one racial impact but exempted another and, thus, the opinion does not work a net negative for minorities. But as a practical matter, Texas's Plan and motivations are not
standard operating procedure for other state actors. States more frequently employ policies that harm, rather than benefit, racial minorities,19 making the elevation of form over function a net negative for
minorities. Thus, while Fisher allowed affirmative action to live to
fight another day and seemingly changed little in terms of explicit doc16. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 226-30 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. granted,
132 S. Ct. 1536, (2012), and vacated and remanded, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).
17. See Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2420.
18. See Fisher, 631 F.3d at 239-40 (mentioning that top ten applicants accounted for 8,984
of the 10,200 UT admittees, and they constituted eighty-eight percent of the admissions offers
for Texas residents and eighty-one percent of enrolled UT freshman).
19. See generally THE LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE EDUCATION FUND, STILL SEGREGATED:
How RACE AND POVERTY STYMIE THE RIGHT To EDUCATION (2013) (reporting on the failure
of U.S. laws to close the existing policy gap as it relates to economical, educational, and racial
equality).
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trine, Fisher reaffirmed an underlying framework that is problematic
on, at least, three levels. First, the effect that policies have on individual lives is just as important, if not more, as the symbolism of those
policies. Form over function, however, gives enormous credence to
symbolism and almost none to the effects. Second, by relying on racial forms as the primary trigger of judicial scrutiny, the Court discourages transparency and encourages the state to employ decisionmaking processes that obscure its real motivations. Those universities
most seriously committed to diversity are unlikely to drop their motivations as a result of Fisher, but they are likely to hide the ways in
which they achieve it. Thus, transparency and predictability, both of
which are important and apparent in Texas's Plan, are lost. Third,
race-neutral forms of achieving diversity tend to be far blunter tools,
and can work at odds with universities' missions. The Court's failure
to appreciate this may force some universities to choose between
equally valid goals: achieving diversity or operating nuanced, selective
admissions programs.
This Essay proceeds in three parts. As background to Fisher, the
first Part of this Essay analyzes the Court's decision in Parents Involved, demonstrating the enormous role that racial forms played in
the outcome and questioning whether the line between form and function is a meaningful one. It also points out that because this distinction between form and function may only be a technical one,
sophisticated schools have found ways to consider race without relying
on the technically prohibited racial forms, which calls into question
the Court's premise regarding the importance of racial forms. The
second Part analyzes the form and function of race in university admissions, comparing the University of Michigan's law school and undergraduate admissions programs to the University of Texas. This
comparison demonstrates that the ways in which a program operates
and the results it produces carry little weight. Again, the Court is primarily concerned with the form that racial considerations take. The
final Part briefly discusses how the elevation of form over function has
an even more significant negative effect on minorities when the racial
considerations in question are insidious rather than benign. The
Court's current intentional discrimination standards leave the vast
majority of racial inequity untouched so long as defendants avoid obvious racial forms.
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I. VOLUNTARY SCHOOL DESEGREGATION: DRAWING A
FINE LINE BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL RACE
CLASSIFICATIONS AND RACE CONSCIOUSNESS
A full appreciation of the triumph of form over function in race
cases must begin with an analysis of Justice Kennedy's controlling
opinion in Parents Involved v. Seattle Schools; it is there that Justice
Kennedy makes the point most clearly. Parents Involved produced a
fractured opinion in which four justices would have held that neither
diversity nor the elimination of de facto segregation in education is a
compelling interest sufficient to justify the use of race in assigning students to public schools.2 0 Those four justices added that, even if diversity or eliminating de facto segregation was a compelling interest, the
plans in question were not narrowly tailored. 2 1 Conversely, the four
dissenting justices would have held that the student assignment plans
were supported by a compelling interest and were narrowly tailored. 22
Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion rested in the middle. He agreed
with the four dissenters that a compelling interest existed,2 but he
also agreed with the four other justices in the majority that the plans
were not narrowly tailored. 24 Thus, Justice Kennedy's concurrence is
the controlling opinion in the case.2 5
While Justice Kennedy indicated that the plans were not narrowly
tailored, the language of his opinion revealed that his primary concern
was the racial forms employed, not any specific impact suffered by
students or any available alternative that would have worked better to
achieve all of the schools' legitimate goals. Nowhere in his opinion
did Justice Kennedy indicate he was striking down the plans because
the use of race was overly broad or dominated the assignment process,
nor could he have made such a claim. On a functional level, race
played a relatively small role in the assignment of students, particularly when compared to the hundreds of desegregation plans that previously came before the courts in which race played a definitive role in
20.
(2007).
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 730-32

See id. at 726.
See id. at 855 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
See id. at 797-98 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
See id. at 786-87 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
See Doe v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 665 F.3d 524, 560 n.32 (3d Cir. 2011); see also U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE & U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., GUIDANCE ON THE VOLUNTARY USE OF RACE TO
ACHIEVE DIVERSITY

SCHOOLS
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the assignment of nearly every student in the district.2 6 Far more important than race in Louisville and Seattle was parental choice.27 The
districts did not mandate that any student attend any school based
solely on race. 28 Rather, the districts operated a school choice plan in
which parents' voluntary choices were the decisive factor in where the
overwhelming number of students went to school. 29 Race only became a factor in a small percentage of assignments-those in which a
school was oversubscribed, other race-neutral factors had been exhausted, and the failure to consider race would produce a school enrollment that was significantly imbalanced in comparison to the
district's overall demographics. 0 But in most all instances, schools
were not oversubscribed or non-racial tiebreakers were sufficient to
determine enrollment in oversubscribed schools. In short, while these
voluntary desegregation plans had a race-conscious goal, race was
only infrequently considered in individual student assignments.
Of particular importance is also the fact that, at the most basic
functional level of whether any student was denied educational opportunity, these plans produced a lot of good without substantially harming anyone. In Seattle, for instance, students got into their first or
second choice of schools ninety-seven percent of the time." The remaining three percent were still assigned to a school in the district.
This is the opposite of higher education admissions where only a small
percentage is enrolled and those denied enrollment attend substantially different schools, potentially lower in quality and in distant locations.33 Because voluntary desegregation plans assign all students to
some school within the district, Goodwin Liu has argued that volun26. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 6, 29-31 (1971)
(upholding the mandatory student assignment and busing of students, along with a reliance on
statistics as a starting point for assessing appropriate integration).
27. See Derek W. Black, In Defense of Voluntary Desegregation:All Things Are Not Equal,
44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 107, 151, 165 (2009).

28. See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 812, 818 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
29. See id. (discussing Seattle's and Louisville's choice programs). The overwhelming popularity of the district's voluntary desegregation plan was likewise a testament to the fact that
parents, in large part, controlled their children's destiny, not their children's race. See, e.g., Emily Bazelon, The Next Kind of Integration,N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2008, at 38 (discussing an eightyeight percent parental support rating for Louisville's desegregation plan); see also Comfort ex
rel. Neumyer v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 283 F. Supp. 2d 328, 349 (D. Mass. 2003) (discussing actions
to make the plan popular among all demographics).
30. See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 812, 818 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
31. See id. at 813.
32. See id. at 812-13.
33. Ms. Gratz, for instance, enrolled at the University of Michigan at Dearborn after being
denied admission to the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244,
251 (2003).
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tary desegregation plans are more akin to voter redistricting than affirmative action in higher education.3 4 In redistricting, individuals are
"sorted" by race, but they are not granted or denied opportunities
based on race. As such, the Court has applied a different legal analysis to voter redistricting." If schools in integrating districts were significantly unequal, the analogy to voting would fall apart, as a student
might have the opportunity to receive an adequate education in one
school but not another. The evidence in Parents Involved, however,
showed that the districts went to great lengths to ensure quality educational opportunities in all their schools.3 6 Thus, the major concern of
affirmative action opponents-the impact on innocent third parties3 7 -was essentially non-existent in Parents Involved.
The limited function of race in ParentsInvolved and the minimal
practical consequences that students suffered, were trumped by Justice Kennedy's concern with the particular racial forms employed by
the districts. Justice Kennedy's entire opinion rests on the premise
that individual race classifications are stigmatic in and of themselves.
Thus, they harm individuals, regardless of the motivations or precise
practical effect of the classification. Justice Kennedy reasoned that,
by drawing racial classifications, one is necessarily expressing a "racial
preference" and using it to treat individuals differently.3 8 Drawing on
34. See Goodwin Liu, Seattle and Louisville, 95 CALIF. L. REv. 277, 311 (2007). Liu further
explains:
In redistricting, however, there is no suggestion that government must "treat citizens as
individuals" in an equally strict sense. A legislature does not violate equal protection
when it assigns an individual voter or even a few voters to an electoral district predominantly based on race. The concern arises only when "race [is] the predominant factor
motivating the legislature's decision to place a significant number of voters within or
without a particular district" in derogation of traditional districting principles.
Does this imply that de minimis racial discrimination is permitted in redistricting?
Of course not. It implies that the stringent norm of individualized treatment developed
in the admissions context does not extend to redistricting because the use of race in
sorting does not present the same hazards as the use of race in selection.
Id. (alteration in original).
35. See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 976-81 (1996) (plurality opinion); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 915 (1995).
36. See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 820 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Comfort ex rel.
Neumyer v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 283 F. Supp. 2d 328, 352-53 (D. Mass. 2003) (describing the
educational success of the voluntary desegregation plan); Black, supra note 27, at 123.
37. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 260 (1995) (noting that by making
race a necessary qualification for preference in the 1977 Act, Asian American and African
American millionaires would have qualified for preference while millionaires of other races
would not).
38. See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 793 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment). And, of course, Justice Kennedy is not alone on this score. The characterization
of racial classifications as racial preferences is littered throughout other Supreme Court opinions. See, e.g., Gratz, 539 U.S. at 267-68; Adarand Constructors, 515 U.S. at 220.
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prior opinions, Justice Kennedy reiterated that "there is simply no
way of determining what classifications are 'benign' or 'remedial' and
what classifications are in fact motivated by illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or simple racial politics."" In other words, he, along
with a majority of the Court, sees all racial classifications as roughly
equivalent, not because they operate the same, but because they all
share the same problematic form.
According to Justice Kennedy, even "benign" classifications stigmatize. Race classifications present a "danger to individual freedom"
and "cause [a] hurt or anger of the type the Constitution prevents." 4 0
He explained:
To be forced to live under a state-mandated racial label is inconsistent with the dignity of individuals in our society. And it is a label
that an individual is powerless to change. Governmental classifications that command people to march in different directions based
on racial typologies can cause a new divisiveness. The practice can
lead to corrosive discourse, where race serves not as an element of
our diverse heritage but instead as a bargaining chip in the political
process.
The idea that if race is the problem, race is the instrument with
which to solve it cannot be accepted as an analytical leap forward.... Under our Constitution the individual, child or adult, can
find his own identity, can define her own persona, without state intervention that classifies on the basis of his race or the color of her
skin.41
While well-intentioned, the districts' use of racial classifications in
assigning students to schools "reduce[d] children to racial chits." 42
They assigned value to race, whereby students, as "racial chits," were
"traded according to one school's supply [of a particular race] and
another's demand." 43 This alone would have been sufficient for Justice Kennedy to find the voluntary desegregation plans unconstitutional, but Justice Kennedy went a step further and criticized the
particular racial forms used. He repeatedly indicated that the districts' chosen classifications-"white and non-white"-were "crude"
labels on their face. They furthered a false racial binary of two racial
39.
469, 493
40.
41.
42.
43.

2014]

See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 783 (quoting Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S.
(1989) (plurality opinion)).
See id. at 790.
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See id
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groups and treated all non-white students as fungible." Thus, not
only did they classify individuals by race, they classified individuals
inaccurately and lumped them into catch-all groups that obfuscated
their racial identity.
Justice Kennedy's concern with form over function was even
clearer in his distinction between the foregoing uses of race and others
that he would find less objectionable. In particular, he drew a sharp
distinction between individual race classifications and general considerations of race. By individual classifications, Justice Kennedy was referring to instances in which the government identifies an individual
student's race and relies on it in making a decision about that student.
By general consideration of race, he was referring to a governmental
policy that is race conscious or has racial motivations, but does not
actually rely on individual students' racial classifications in making decisions about those students as individuals. Speaking of this distinction between individual race classifications and general uses of race,
Justice Kennedy wrote:
In the administration of public schools by the state and local authorities it is permissible to consider the racial makeup of schools and to
adopt general policies to encourage a diverse student body, one aspect of which is its racial composition. If school authorities are concerned that the student-body compositions of certain schools
interfere with the objective of offering an equal educational opportunity to all of their students, they are free to devise race-conscious
measures to address the problem in a general way and without
treating each student in different fashion solely on the basis of a
systematic, individual typing by race.4 5
A district might, for instance, consider the racial demographics of
neighborhoods in making a "strategic site selection of new schools;
drawing attendance zones . . . ; [and] allocating resources for special

programs," 4 6 or consider race in "recruiting students and faculty in a
targeted fashion; and tracking enrollments, performance, and other
statistics." 47 The formal distinction between individual classifications
and general considerations of race is so significant to Justice Kennedy
that he wrote "it is unlikely any of [these general considerations of
race] would demand strict scrutiny to be found permissible." 4 8
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
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Justice Kennedy is correct that these two uses of race are formally
different. It is less clear, however, that this formal distinction is as
normatively important as he declared. Following the decision in Parents Involved, districts committed to racial diversity or reducing racial
isolation have adopted student assignment policies that are explicitly
race conscious, but which do not rely on individual racial classifications.4 9 The most aggressive of these plans have been able to produce
levels of integration nearly identical to those contemplated in Parents
Involved."o On the one hand, the effectiveness of some post-Parents
Involved plans would appear to vindicate Justice Kennedy and those
who would argue that race-neutral options are available and we
should pursue them first. On the other hand, these race-neutral options have proven complicated, burdensome to administer, less transparent, and not necessarily politically more popular than plans that
relied more directly on race. Most important, the line between these
plans and those in Parents Involved is extremely thin.
One of the most prominent post-ParentsInvolved plans is in the
Berkeley Unified School District. Its current student assignment plan
does not rely on students' individual racial classifications.5 ' Instead,
the plan considers group level racial data. The district uses the demographic characteristics of the neighborhood in which a student livesincluding the average household income, the average education level
of adults, and the percentage of "students of color"-to calculate a
diversity category for each student. 52 The district then assigns students from each diversity category proportionately to individual
schools so as to approximate the racial and socioeconomic diversity of
the overall district." As a result, "'[t]he actual personal attributes of
students' [are] not relied upon 'in determining student
assignments.' "54

49. See generally DEP'T OF JUSTICE & DEP'T OF EDuc., supra note 25 (providing guidance

to elementary and secondary schools on how they can voluntarily consider race to achieve diversity or avoid racial isolation).
50. Compare ParentsInvolved, 551 U.S. at 811-12 (implementing a student choice plan with
a racial tie-breaker in order to achieve integration in schools), with Emily Bazelon, The Next
Kind of Integration,N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2008, at MM38 (implementing a class-plus-race formula
plan to achieve integration in schools).
51. See American Civil Rights Found. v. Berkeley Unified Sch. Dist., 90 Cal. Rptr. 3d 789,
794 (App. 1st Dist. 2009).
52. See id.
53. See id.
54. Id.
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In this last respect, the assignment plan is formalistically distinct
from the assignment plans in Parents Involved, but in all others, there
is little difference. They are all race conscious; they all seek to achieve
racial balance reflective of the district as a whole; and race does, in
fact, play a role in where a student is assigned. The Berkley plan is
distinct only in that it is the race of student's neighbors, not his own,
that is determinative. Per Justice Kennedy's reasoning, this distinction
is crucially important. Yet, Berkeley's consideration of race is barely
removed from the individual student's race. It goes right to the edge
of Parents Involved's prohibition and stops short. Given existing
housing segregation, a student's neighbors' race strongly correlates
with the student's own race." This reality begs the question of
whether the distinction between individual classifications and general
race consciousness is one without meaning.
It is true that the Berkeley plan is race-neutral in regard to the
individual. A white student living in a minority neighborhood would
receive the same diversity category as his minority neighbors. But this
fact is of more theoretical importance than practical. If this possibility
were of significant practical relevance, the district would be thwarted
in its attempt to produce diverse schools through its current plan. In
this hypothetical world, the district could better achieve diversity by
adopting a simple neighborhood school policy and ignoring race altogether. But we know neither of these things is true. Housing segregation is so prevalent in most metropolitan areas that the foregoing
possibility is but a minor exception to the dominant rule.5 6 As such,
the only real reasons for assigning students in the way Berkeley does
are to avoid a technical breach of the prohibited individual classification form and present the illusion of race neutrality.
Most telling is the California appellate court's willingness in
American Civil Rights Foundationv. Berkeley Unified School District

to exploit form over function to the school district's advantage in
fending off a challenge to the school assignment plan.57 Early on in its
opinion, the court focused on the fact that "any preference given to
55. See id.; see also Sean F. Reardon & John T. Yun, IntegratingNeighborhoods, Segregating
Schools: The Retreat from School Desegregationin the South, 1990-2000, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1563,
1575-81 (2003) (discussing the gravity of interdistrict school segregation and its relationship to
housing segregation).
56. See generally Reardon & Yun, supra note 55, at 1576 (exploring the high levels of educational and residential segregation in metropolitan areas).
57. See American Civil Rights Found. v. Berkeley Unified Sch. Dist., 90 Cal. Rptr. 3d 789,
792.
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the student is not based on the student's race. White and AfricanAmerican students from the same neighborhood receive the same diversity rating and the same treatment."5 It acknowledged that actual
facts might make this point largely irrelevant, but in the context of a
facial challenge to the policy, theoretical justifications were sufficient.
The court wrote:
There is no indication that, in every case, a student from a category
one planning area is more likely to be a student of color than is a
student from a category three planning area. It appears mathematically possible that a category one planning area may have more
White students than students of color depending on the area's
household income and adult education levels.
While it is conceivable . . . that some neighborhoods are so ra-

cially segregated that using demographic data could potentially
serve as a proxy for a student's race, that hypothetical possibility
cannot sustain [Plaintiff's] facial challenge to the constitutional validity of the . . . assignment policy. On a facial challenge, we do not

consider the policy's application to the particular circumstances of
an individual. "[O]ur task is to determine whether the [challenged
policy] can constitutionally be applied." "'To support a determination of facial unconstitutionality, voiding the statute [or policy] as a
whole, petitioners cannot prevail by suggesting that in some future
hypothetical situation constitutional problems may possibly arise as
to the particular application of the statute.

. .

. Rather, petitioners

must demonstrate that the act's provisions inevitably pose a present
total and fatal conflict with applicable constitutional prohibitions.'
[Plaintiff] has not shown that the policy provisions challenged here
inevitably pose a total and fatal conflict with section 31.9
The trouble with the court's appr6ach is that demographics can
serve as proxy in almost every metropolitan area in the country, they
do.6 0 In other words, for the facial challenge to be dismissed out of
hand, the court had to assume a set of facts that do not exist.
None of the foregoing is a criticism of the assignment plan in
Berkeley or any others that approximate it. These districts are committed to maintaining racially diverse schools and avoiding racially

58. Id. at 798.
59. Id. at 798-99 (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
60. See generally Reardon & Yun, supra note 55, at 1576 (discussing the relationship between demographics and segregation).
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isolated schools.6 1 They understand the significant educational and
social benefits that accrue from integrated schools.62 Justice Kennedy
indicated that form matters more than function, and these districts responded accordingly. Instead, the point of the foregoing is to question
whether there is any significant functional difference or motivation
between the plans at issue in Parents Involved and race conscious
plans that eschewed individual classifications afterward. If there is no
functional difference, one must also query whether form is as significant as Justice Kennedy asserted. First, in striking down the most obvious means by which to achieve diversity and integration, the Court
expressed a hostility toward integration that dissuades most districts
because they are litigation averse as a general principle." Second,
even those not generally dissuaded face an uphill battle. Pushing districts to use different forms imposes significant administrative burdens
on them, which can be prohibitive for less sophisticated or less
wealthy districts.6 4 These burdens might be justified if there were
some significant benefit to the Court's move, but such a benefit is far
from clear.
Justice Kennedy defends the negative effect of his holding in Parents Involved with the assertion that "[t]o make race matter now so
that it might not matter later may entrench the very prejudices we
seek to overcome."6 5 The notion that elevating form over function
will help eliminate prejudice or prevent entrenchment rests on questionable assumptions. First, eliminating formal individual classifications only matters if Justice Kennedy is correct that plans like those in
Seattle or Louisville entrench prejudice. Logic and available evidence
would suggest they do the opposite. By creating integrated schools,
race conscious student assignment plans ironically make race irrele61. See generally NAACP LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND, INC., Still Looking to the Future:
Voluntary K-12 School Integration, A Manual for Parents, Educators & Advocates (2008) (discussing research and theories regarding voluntary integration in schools).
62. See Black, supra note 27, at 112 (discussing whether voluntary desegregation stigmatizes
children).
63. See Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, The Constitutional Future of Race-Neutral Efforts to
Achieve Diversity and Avoid Racial Isolation in Elementary and Secondary Schools, 50 B.C. L.
REV. 277, 280 (2009) (noting that the Court's decision will "make any consideration of race in
student assignments so difficult and impractical" that few districts, if any, will continue to consider race in school assignment plans).
64. See id. at 288 ("Even if a district considers race-neutral alternatives, the necessity requirement will create a difficult burden for a school district to meet for several reasons.").
65. Parents Involved in Comm. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 782 (2007)
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
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vant in parents' choices of where to send their kids.66 If all schools are
roughly equal in their racial composition, families necessarily must
base their decision on factors other than race. But, when schools are
imbalanced, race-rather than other legitimate educational considerations-becomes a major determinate of school choice for families and
teachers. 7
Second, even if assignments based on individual race classifications stigmatized students for reasons overlooked here, nothing indicates that a Berkeley-style plan produces less stigma. Does anyone
but attorneys, judges, and a few educational experts perceive Berkley's plan differently than Louisville's? For Justice Kennedy's assumptions to prove true, this distinction would need meaning beyond
experts. It would need to matter to those purportedly stigmatized because, at the level of district motivations and actual results, the preand post-ParentsInvolved plans are nearly identical, and the stigma is
presumably the same.
Those who oppose the intentional integration-who are also
often the ones raising the notion of stigma-do not appear to see a
meaningful distinction between the Berkeley plan and the ParentsInvolved plans. After all, the American Civil Rights Foundation, an
anti-affirmative action group, brought suit against Berkeley.68 Similarly, when Wake County, North Carolina, began assigning students
based on socioeconomic status rather than race, individuals filed a
complaint with the Office for Civil Rights at the Department of Education that alleged that socioeconomic status was a proxy for race,6 9
even though the district had a robust research basis for relying on socioeconomic status.70 Thus, opponents' fundamental objection to
66. See Black, supra note 27, at 181.
The unfortunate truth is that the history of de jure school segregation has not left us,
and the invidious racial values that it indoctrinated continue to linger. As a result,
parents and teachers make decisions based on race that only further exacerbate inequality. Voluntarily desegregating schools, however, does not run from this reality; it
confronts it. By creating racially balanced schools, voluntary desegregation attempts to
make our racial biases irrelevant. For once, it makes us choose our schools based on
factors other than race. In short, it uses race to make race irrelevant.
Id.
67. See id. at 107 ("The lingering effects of past school segregation continue to stigmatize
predominantly minority schools. As a result, quality teachers and middle-income students flee
to other schools, depriving minority schools of the key resources for success.").
68. See American Civil Rights Found. v. Berkeley Unified Sch. Dist., 90 Cal. Rptr. 3d 789,
792 (App. 1st Dist. 2009).
69. See RICHARD KAHLENBERG, ALL TOGETHER Now: CREATING MIDDLE-CLASS
SCHOOLS THROUGH PUBLIC SCHOOL CHOICE 252 (2001).
70. See, e.g., id.; see also JAMES S. COLEMAN ET AL., EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNiTY 21-22 (1966); Geoffrey D. Borman & Maritza Dowling, Schools and Inequality: A Mul-
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these student assignment plans would seem to be their function, not
their form. More bluntly, opponents of these plans tend to not really
care how the district goes about achieving integration; what they care
about is stopping the ends the districts seek to achieve: integrated
schools and the transportation of students beyond the confines of
their racially isolated neighborhoods." While Justice Kennedy's opinion stops short of their extreme anti-integration position. Justice Kennedy delivers a symbolic victory for opponents of integration by
striking down the plans in Parents Involved.7 2
For this reason, some commentators question whether Justice
Kennedy does, in fact, countenance race based programs.73 They suspect that Justice Kennedy is more concerned with being at the middle
of the Court so that he can be the "decider" 74 and narrowly avoiding a
legacy as the justice who ended affirmative action. One can draw
these inferences, although Justice Kennedy's opinion in Parents Involved includes passages so forceful that I have trouble doubting his
sincerity. He struck out directly at the more conservative justices and
their fundamental principle, writing that Justice Roberts' opinion in
ParentsInvolved reflects:

[A]n all-too-unyielding insistence that race cannot be a factor in instances when, in my view, it may be taken into account. The pluraltilevel Analysis of Coleman's Equality of EducationalOpportunity Data, 112 TCHRS. COLL. REC.
1201 (2010); Molly S. McUsic, The Future of Brown v. Board of Education: Economic Integration of the Public Schools, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1334, 1355-56 (2004); Russell W. Rumberger &
Gregory J. Palardy, Does Segregation Still Matter? The Impact of Social Composition on Academic Achievement in High School, 107 TCHRS. COLL. REC. 1999, 1999 (2005).
71. See Richard D. Kahlenberg, A Tea Party Defeat on Schools in North Carolina, CENTURY FOUNDATION 1203-04 (Oct. 14, 2011), http://72.32.39.237:8080/Plone/blogs/botc/2011/10/atea-party-defeat-on-schools-in-north-carolina.
72. Justice Kennedy split hairs so thin with his various distinctions in ParentsInvolved that
some ignored his nuance and only focused on those aspects with which he agreed with the four
other conservative members of the Court. For instance, the Office for Civil Rights, following the
Court's decision, issued a Dear Colleague Letter that did not even acknowledge the avenues
Justice Kennedy left open and implied that the districts were now barred from any sort of race
conscious integration in the future. See Samuels & Lhamon, supra note 14.
73. See Michelle Adams, Stifling the Potential of Grutter v. Bollinger: Parents Involved in
Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 88 B.U. L. REV. 937, 943 (2008) ("Justice
Kennedy's Parents Involved concurrence demonstrates both an openness to racial diversity as an
ideal and an abhorrence of '[g]overnmental classifications that command people to march in
different directions based on racial typologies."') (quoting Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 797)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Eboni S. Nelson, The Availability and Viability of Socioeconomic Integration Post-Parents Involved, 59 S.C. L. REV. 841
(2008) (discussing class as a measure of diversity and the Supreme Court's interpretations in
Parents Involved).
74. See Stuart Taylor Jr. et al., The PowerBroker, NEWSWEEK, July 16, 2007, at 36 (discussing an interview with Justice Kennedy regarding his critics who believe he is "perhaps a little too
eager to play the role of Wise Man in the Middle.").
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ity opinion is too dismissive of the legitimate interest government
has in ensuring all people have equal opportunity regardless of their
race. The plurality's postulate that "[t]he way to stop discrimination
on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race," is
not sufficient to decide these cases. Fifty years of experience since
Brown v. Board of Education should teach us that the problem
before us defies so easy a solution. School districts can seek to
reach Brown's objective of equal educational opportunity. The plurality opinion is at least open to the interpretation that the Constitution requires school districts to ignore the problem of de facto
resegregation in schooling. I cannot endorse that conclusion. To
the extent the plurality opinion suggests the Constitution mandates
that state and local school authorities must accept the status quo of
racial isolation in schools, it is, in my view, profoundly mistaken.s
Those words do not sound like those of a justice with an ulterior
agenda. Rather, they reflect a justice who harbors a strong commitment to integration in theory and is willing to sanction state intervention to produce it. This would mean that the appropriate critique of
Justice Kennedy is that his concerns are so dominated by theory that
he disregards function and is inherently skeptical about forms, not
that his uneasiness reflects a diabolic design to strike down every racebased plan that comes before the Court. 76 After all, in Parents Involved, he explicitly points out that it is the form that troubles him,
not the end, and he points the way toward other forms that he would
not even subject to strict scrutiny.
II.

UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS: REFUSING TO TAKE
FUNCTION AND CONTEXT INTO ACCOUNT

The triumph of form over function is not as explicit in Fisher v.
Texas as Parents Involved because the Court did not strike down the
University of Texas's admissions policy. Yet, the Court refused to uphold the plan, and a close examination of the opinion reveals the triumph of form. First, important racial aspects of the University's
admissions program went largely unaddressed by the Court. A comparison of those aspects it ignored with those that drew its focus
reveals the Court's continuing concern with form over function. Sec75. Parents Involved in Comm. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 787-88 (2007)
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
76. Justice Kennedy would have, however, struck down every plan in the past. See, e.g.,
ParentsInvolved, 551 U.S. 701 (2007); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
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ond, a functional comparison between the admissions plans in Grutter,
Gratz, and Fisher reveals that there is little reason to be suspicious of
the Texas policy. Rather, the Court's unwillingness to uphold the plan
in Fisher grows out of formalistic rather than functional concerns.
A. The Holistic Operation of the University of Texas's Admissions
Process
The predicate step to understanding the Court's formal rather
than functional approach in Fisher is to understand the admissions
process holistically. The Court's opinion focuses on the narrow aspect
of the admissions process that explicitly relies on race, but the admissions process at the University of Texas is multilayered and complex.
Focusing just on the explicit consideration of race distorts how admissions operate at the University of Texas and the role that race plays in
the process. In fact, a full picture of the admissions program cannot
be had from the Supreme Court opinion in Fisher. Rather, one must
refer back to the lower courts' opinions, which detail the history and
impact of the admissions program. 7
After the Fifth Circuit struck down the University of Texas
School of Law's consideration of race in admissions in Hopwood v.
Texas78 in 1996, the entire University was forced to rethink how it
might achieve diversity without considering race. Ultimately, the University of Texas adopted a "Personal Achievement Index" in its undergraduate admissions program. 7 9 The personal achievement index
takes into account things like students' leadership and work experience, awards, extracurricular activities, and community service.80 It
also takes into account special circumstances that might have impeded
a student's educational and life opportunities, such as growing up in a
single-parent home, speaking a language other than English at home,
significant familial responsibilities, and the low socioeconomic status
of the student's family." This personal achievement index was considered in conjunction with a student's academic index, as measured
by test scores and high school grades.8 2 By considering these personalized achievement factors, the University could both add context to
77. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 645 F. Supp. 2d 587, 590-99 (W.D. Tex. 2009),
affd, 631 F.3d 213, 222-26 (5th Cir. 2011), vacated and remanded, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).
78. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 934 (5th Cir. 1996).
79. See Fisher, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 596.
80. See id. at 597.
81. See id.
82. See id. at 596.
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students' raw achievement scores and identify personal traits that
might add to the University's diversity.
The Texas legislature also got involved in maintaining some level
of diversity at the University and passed a statute whereby the top ten
percent of each high school's graduating class would be automatically
admitted to any public college in the state, including the University of
Texas." These two policies-the Top Ten Percent Plan and the personal achievement index-remained in place for nearly a decade. But
after the Court upheld the consideration of race in admissions in Grutter-thereby reversing Hopwood-the University took steps to reinstitute the consideration of race in admissions.' It reasoned, based on
a formal study, that its admissions policy did not enroll a sufficient
number of minorities to produce the educational benefits of racial diversity at the classroom level." The study revealed that, in fall 2002,
nearly all of the University's small classes "had either one or zero African-American students, 41% had one or zero Asian-American students, and 37% had either one or zero Hispanic students."8 6 A survey
of students also indicated that "[m]inority students reported feeling
isolated, and a majority of all students felt there was 'insufficient minority representation' in classrooms for 'the full benefits of diversity
to occur.' "87

In response, the University adopted an explicitly race conscious
admission process that left the previous one intact, save one exception. The University added race as one of the factors for consideration in a student's personal achievement index. Race was not assigned
an explicit numerical value, but race was a meaningful factor. 8 In
terms of the overall group of admitted students, this consideration of
race came into play only a small percentage of the time. For instance,
in 2008, a total of 10,200 admissions slots were available for Texas
residents. Students admitted under the Top Ten Percent Plan filled
83. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 51.803 (West 2009).
84. See Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and
in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 2-5, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex.
at Austin, 645 F. Supp. 2d 587 (W.D. Tex. 2009) (No. 1:08-CV-00263-SS).
85. See id. at 4.
86. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 225 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S.
Ct. 1536 (2012), and vacated and remanded, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).
87. Id.
88. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 645 F. Supp. 2d 587, 610 n.14 (W.D. Tex. 2009),
affd, 631 F.3d 213, 222-26 (5th Cir. 2011), vacated and remanded, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).
89. See Fisher,631 F.3d at 239.

2014]

495

Howard Law Journal

8,984 of those slots.9 0 This left only 1,216 seats, or roughly twelve percent of the seats, available for more nuanced personalized review.91
Thus, the potential consideration of race was limited to a small portion of the student body.
As to the twelve percent of the student body where race could
have played a role, race was embedded alongside various other
equally relevant and significant factors in the personal achievement
index. "The Personal Achievement Index is based on three scores:
one score for each of the two required essays and a third score, called
the personal achievement score, which represents an evaluation of the
applicant's entire file."9 2 Only on this third factor was race relevant.
Even there, it was considered alongside with and in conjunction with
other factors, including demonstrated leadership qualities, awards and
honors, work experience, extracurricular activities, community service, the "socioeconomic status of the applicant and his or her high
school, the applicant's family status and family responsibilities, [and]
the applicant's standardized test score compared to the average of her
high school."" Neither race nor any of these factors is "considered
individually or given separate numerical values to be added together.
Rather, the file is evaluated as a whole in order to provide the fullest
possible understanding of the student as a person and to place his or
her achievements in context."9 4
If one were to visualize the University's admissions policy and the
basis upon which students are admitted as a pie chart, the Top Ten
Percent Plan would absorb almost the entire pie. The remaining piece
of the pie would be so small that one would struggle to list all of the
factors that go into allotting this small piece of the pie on the chart's
legend. If one managed to list all these factors on the legend, it would
only be people who read very carefully and have good eyesight who
would pick up the fact that race played a role in admissions. Such a
person, however, would presumably also notice the asterisks at the
end of the list noting that these factors are considered collectively, not
individually. Such a person might then reasonably ask whether that
small piece of the pie warranted so much ink. A simple "holistic competitive admissions" label might have sufficed. Of course, discrimina90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
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tion based on race against just one person triggers constitutional
protection. The foregoing is not meant to suggest otherwise. Rather,
the point is that current jurisprudence permits universities to explicitly
consider race in admissions, and one must seriously query whether the
explicit consideration of race could play any smaller of a role than it
already does at the University of Texas. The Court in Fisher, however, does not ask that question because its analysis hinges more on
the formalistic than the functional use of race.
With that said, an honest functional approach reveals that race
plays a much larger role in admissions than the Court or the foregoing
sections of this Essay suggest. The foregoing analysis only explores
the functional role that the explicit consideration of race through individual race classifications plays. But on the question of what role race
functionally plays, regardless of whether it is achieved by individual
race classifications, the answer is that the role is enormous. Given its
analytical approach, the Court misses what is right below the surface
of the purportedly race-neutral Top Ten Percent Plan: racial motivation and racial functionality. Neither was lost on the Fifth Circuit. On
the Plan's motivation, the Fifth Circuit wrote: "The Top Ten Percent
Law did not by its terms admit students on the basis of race, but underrepresented minorities were its announced target and their admission a large, if not primary, purpose." 9 5 On the Plan's racial
functionality, the Fifth Circuit acknowledged: "In 2004, among freshmen who were Texas residents, 77% of the enrolled African-American students and 78% of the Hispanic students had been
admitted under the Top Ten Percent Law, compared to 62% of Caucasian students." 9 6
In her dissent in Fisher,Justice Ginsberg lambasted the majority
for its formalistic approach and blindness to these realities. She
wrote:
[O]nly an ostrich could regard the supposedly neutral alternatives as
race unconscious. As Justice Souter observed, the vaunted alternatives suffer from 'the disadvantage of deliberate obfuscation.'
Texas' percentage plan was adopted with racially segregated
neighborhoods and schools front and center stage. [As the Texas
House Research Organization's bill analysis found prior to passing
the law,] '[m]any regions of the state, school districts, and high
schools in Texas are still predominantly composed of people from a
95. Id. at 224.
96. Id.
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single racial or ethnic group. Because of the persistence of this segregation, admitting the top 10 percent of all high schools would provide a diverse population and ensure that a large, well qualified
pool of minority students was admitted to Texas universities.' It is
race consciousness, not blindness to race, that drives such plans.97
Justice Ginsberg was not suggesting that the Court strike down
the admissions policy on other grounds. She was pointing out the majority's formalistic framework for deciding race cases makes little
sense. Justice Kennedy's majority opinion offered no response, nor
did it need to. He made clear in Parents Involved that the formalistic
use of race, not its function, matters most.
B.

Comparing Texas's Process to Michigan's

A comparison of the admissions plans in Grutter, Gratz v. Bollinand Fisher yields the same conclusion: the Court ignored how
race functions in Fisher. The admissions policies in these three cases
are drastically different from one another. The only thing that binds
them together is their form: they all relied on individual racial classifications as a factor in the admissions process.99 How they used the
race classification varied significantly. The discussion of the University of Texas's use of race is above and need not be repeated here.100
Gratz involved the undergraduate admissions process at the University of Michigan. While Michigan considered a number of factors in
making admissions decisions, those factors, including race, operated
mechanically and automatically. "Each application received points
based on high school grade point average, standardized test scores,
academic quality of an applicant's high school, strength or weakness

ger,98

97. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. at 2433 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted). Justice Ginsberg further wrote in a footnote:
The notion that Texas' Top Ten Percent Law is race neutral calls to mind Professor
Thomas Reed Powell's famous statement: "If you think that you can think about a thing
inextricably attached to something else without thinking of the thing which it is attached to, then you have a legal mind." Only that kind of legal mind could conclude
that an admissions plan specifically designed to produce racial diversity is not race
conscious.
Id. at 2433 n.2 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (internal citation omitted).

98. 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
99. See generally Fisher,133 S. Ct. 2411 (holding that burden of evidence primarily lies with
the university "to prove that its admissions program is narrowly tailored to obtain the educational benefits of diversity."); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (holding that student
body diversity is a compelling state interest that can justify the use of race in university admissions); Gratz, 539 U.S. 244 (holding that a state university's admission policy violated the Equal

Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because its ranking system gave an automatic
point increase to all racial minorities rather than making individual determinations).
100. See supra notes 75-95 and accompanying text.
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of high school curriculum, in-state residency, alumni relationship, personal essay, and personal achievement or leadership."' 0' Underrepresented minorities were awarded an additional twenty points
based on race. 0 2 A student with a total point value of one hundred or
more was automatically admitted.' 0 Those with scores between
ninety and ninety-nine were either admitted or postponed for a later
decision.' 0 4 Those with scores between seventy-five and eighty-nine
were postponed or delayed."0 s Those below seventy-five were typically rejected or delayed for consideration.10 6
With twenty additional points automatically allotted for race, a
minority student, whose application would otherwise be denied or
delayed, was instead automatically admitted or placed in the next
highest category for admission. In addition, starting in 1999, the University instituted another level of review whereby applicants who were
not already admitted would be flagged for special consideration if the
student demonstrated one of several traits, one of which was being an
underrepresented minority.1 07 The result of these two considerations
of race was that "virtually" all underrepresented minorities that met
the University's minimum qualifications were admitted. 0
Because race was automatic and decisive for most minimally
qualified applicants, the Court's analysis in Gratz was easy. Both the
form and function were problematic and the Court did not need to
draw sharp distinctions to reach its conclusion. But the law school's
consideration of race in Grutter was less obvious and required more
nuanced analysis. The law school's admissions process was based on
an assessment of "academic ability coupled with a flexible assessment
of applicants' talents, experiences, and potential 'to contribute to the
learning of those around them."'109 An applicant's undergraduate
grade point average and Law School Admission Test score were used
to measure academic ability." 0 The law school stressed, however, that
101. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 255.
102. See id.
103. See id.
104. See id.
105. See id.
106. See id.
107. See id. at 256-57.
108. See id. at 253-54.
109. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 315 (2003).
110. See id. ("In reviewing an applicant's file, admissions officials must consider the applicant's undergraduate grade point average (GPA) and Law School Admission Test (LSAT) score
because they are important (if imperfect) predictors of academic success in law school.") (citation omitted).

2014]

499

Howard Law Journal

high academic scores alone did not guarantee admission, nor did low
scores automatically result in rejection.'' Rather, admissions officers
"look beyond grades and test scores to other criteria that are important to the Law School's educational objectives."' 12 One of those
objectives was a diverse learning environment. The policy recognized
that many different characteristics and qualities contribute to a diverse environment and warrant substantial consideration, but the policy emphasized that "racial and ethnic diversity" are particularly
important.113
To ensure the educational benefits of diversity, the school sought
to enroll a "critical mass" of underrepresented minorities." 4 The University did not define a critical mass as any specific percentage of minorities, but roughly defined it as "a number that encourages
underrepresented minority students to participate in the classroom
and not feel isolated.""' Consistent with this flexible goal, race was a
soft variable and only one of several factors considered in the admission of minority applicants. The extent to which race played a role
"varie[d] from one applicant to another. In some cases, . . . an appli-

cant's race may play no role, while in others it may be a 'determinative' factor."11 6 In other words, race was considered as a "plus factor"
that, while making the difference for a great number of minority applicants, did not result in automatic admission, did not lessen the need
to evaluate an applicant's entire file, and did not isolate minority applicants from competition with other applicants.1 7
A comparison of these three admissions programs reveals multiple functional differences that affect the significance of race in each.
First, in Gratz and Grutter, race classifications effectively operated
across the board to all students. The only students arguably unaffected were those undergraduate students, white and minority, who
were automatically admitted without the consideration of race. In
contrast, in Fisher, race classifications only operated in regard to
twelve percent of the student body, at most.
Second, in Gratz, race had a predefined and automatic effect on
an applicant's application. In Grutter and Fisher, the effect was
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
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See id. at 334.
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neither automatic nor predetermined. In Grutter, a white student
could qualify for diversity consideration, just as a minority could. In
Fisher,a poor white student could potentially have his or her life circumstances positively affect his or her personal achievement index in
the same way as a minority. In none of these instances would one's'
race, adversity, or diversity result in automatic admission or a
predefined "bump."
Third, in Grutter,the University emphasized race as a particularly
important form of diversity and explicitly articulated its goals in regard to it. In other words, racial diversity appeared to be more important than other form of diversity or, at least, first among equals. This
was not the case in Fisher. In Fisher, race was listed among various
factors and was not given heightened importance, at least not explicitly. Moreover, none of the various factors were to be considered
alone. Thus, students presumably were not reduced solely to their
race. Rather, students would have been classified as low-income minorities, high-income minorities, low-income whites, whites from single-parent households, minorities who learned English as a second
language, etc. In this respect, race, while very relevant, does not become a trait whereby individuals are essentialized. 18
Fourth, the context in which race arose in Fisher and the factors
alongside which it was considered indicate that racial considerations
were motivated by serious efforts to identify student ability. The history of the University of Texas's admissions policies makes it obvious
that it had strong diversity motivations as well, but the admissions criterion, by its very name, was not "diversity." It was "personal
achievement," which expresses the well-founded notion that a student's admissions test score, high school course enrollments, and
grade point average only tell part of the story of a student's intrinsic
capacity, ability, and potential. Additionally, a significant body of research indicates that socioeconomic status and racial bias are embedded in the typical measures of educational qualifications, particularly

118. See RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: AN INTRODUC62-65 (2d ed. 2012) (discussing the notion that focusing solely on an individual's race essentializes the individual). See generally Kevin Brown, Should Black Immigrants Be Favored over
Black Hispanics and Black Multiracialsin the Admissions Processesof Selective Higher Education Programs?, 54 How. L.J. 255 (2011) (analyzing the modifications and breadth to which
racial groups are defined and affirmative action is applied; pointing out important distinctions
within the group currently labeled "black").
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the SAT."' Thus, if one is going to consider admissions criteria like
the SAT, the only way to "compare apples to apples" when reviewing
student applications is to consider, among other things, race and poverty. If an admissions officer is trying to assess ability, potential, or
overachievement, a 770 score by a high-income student on the reading
portion of the SAT is not equivalent to a 770 by a low-income score.
Rather, the low-income student with the same score as a wealthy student-or even a lower but strong score-most likely has more aptitude than the wealthy student.12 0 Many are uncomfortable with
making the same point in regard to race, but if students are otherwise
similarly situated, a strong basis exists for reaching the same conclusion in regard to race.'
Based on these four functional distinctions, the admissions process in Gratz employed the broadest, most mechanistic, and most consequential use of race, which, of course, rendered it unconstitutional.
The admissions process in Grutter entailed a less consequential and
more flexible-although potentially equally broad-use of race. The
admissions process in Fisherrelied on race in the narrowest of circumstances and alongside equally relevant factors, making it the least consequential consideration of race. These functional differences would
otherwise provide a strong basis for finding the Texas Plan constitutionally permissible, given that the Court had already sanctioned the
program in Grutter, and the Court in Grutterhad relied heavily on the
functional differences between the law school and undergraduate ad-

119. See, e.g., SAT WARS: THE CASE FOR TEST-OPTIONAL COLLEGE ADMISSIONS 20 (Joseph
A. Soares ed., 2012).
120. To push the analysis one step further, a low-income student with a 710 likely has more
capacity than a high-income student with a 770. A study by Anthony Carnevale and Jeff Strohl
found that the most socioeconomically disadvantaged students score 399 points lower on average
on the combined math and verbal SAT than the most socioeconomically advantaged students.
See Anthony P. Carnevale & Jeff Strohl, How Increasing CollegeAccess Is IncreasingInequality,
and What to Do About It, in REWARDING STRIVERS: HELPING Low INCOME STUDENTS SUCCEED
INCOLLEGE 71 (Richard D. Kahlenburg ed., 2010). Given this average gap, a socioeconomically
disadvantaged student who does relatively well on the SAT has defied a lot of odds and obstacles

whereas the high-income student could underachieve his peers and still have a score in excess of
the low-income student. In the long run, however, the low-income student shows more potential. If potential or personal capacity are measures of merit, meritocratic admissions require that
we consider things like socioeconomic status and race rather than ignore them. See id.
121. See Jay Rosner, The SAT: New Techniques, Removing Test Bia, and Case Studies, in
SAT WARS, supra note 119, at 110-14; see also Kimberly West-Faulcon, More Intelligent Test
Design: Testing Measures of Merit, 13 J. CONsT. L. 1235 (2011) (discussing the availability of
alternative test designs that more accurately measure merit and less frequently reproduce racial

bias).
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missions programs.12 2 Moreover, the Court in Grutter specifically emphasized that:
[S]trict scrutiny must take 'relevant differences' into account. Indeed, as we explained, that is its 'fundamental purpose.' Not every
decision influenced by race is equally objectionable, and strict scrutiny is designed to provide a framework for carefully examining the
importance and the sincerity of the reasons advanced by the governmental decisionmaker for the use of race in that particular
context.
The Court in Fisher, however, did not even begin to assess functional differences. The references to Grutter and Gratz in Fisher are
limited to short quotes emphasizing the basic law of strict scrutiny,
with a particular emphasis on a presumption against race classifications and the need to establish race-neutral alternatives. 1 24 While the
Court in Grutter did indicate that a race based policy is constitutional
only when workable race-neutral policies are unavailable, 2 5 the Court
in Grutter did not elevate this to the most important inquiry or suggest
a high standard for "workable."1 26 Many read the Court in Fisher as
doing the opposite on both scores,'127 directing the lower court to "verify that it is 'necessary"' to use race and that "no workable race-neutral alternatives would produce the educational benefits of

122. The. Court in Grutter also offered comparisons between the law school's admissions
process and the Court's original higher education admissions decision in Regents of the Univ. of
Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 336-37.
123. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 327 (citations omitted).
Since Bakke, we have had no occasion to define the contours of the narrow-tailoring inquiry
with respect to race-conscious university admissions programs. That inquiry must be calibrated
to fit the distinct issues raised by the use of race to achieve student body diversity in public
higher education. Contrary to Justice Kennedy's assertions, we do not "abando[n] strict scrutiny[.]" Rather, as we have already explained, we adhere to Adarand's teaching that the very
purpose of strict scrutiny is to take such "relevant differences into account."
Id. at 333-34 (first alteration in original) (citations omitted).
124. See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2418-21 (2013).
125. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339 ("Narrow tailoring does, however, require serious, good
faith consideration of workable race-neutral alternatives that will achieve the diversity the university seeks.") (citation omitted).
126. In fact, the Court's failure to demand a high standard was the primary criticism levied in
Justice Kennedy's dissent in Grutter. See id. at 387 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
127. See, e.g., Eboni S. Nelson, Reading Between the Blurred Lines of Fisher v. University of
Texas, VAL. U.L. REV. (forthcoming); COLLEGE BOARD & EDUCATION COUNSEL, LLC, UNDERSTANDING FISHER V. THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS: POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF WHAT THE U.S.
SUPREME COURT DID (AND DIDN'T) SAY ABOUT DIVERSITY AND THE USE OF RACE AND
ETHNICrr IN COLLEGE ADMIssioNs (July 9, 2013).
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diversity."' 28 The Court is clear that, at the very least, the lower
courts' deference to the University on these points was an error.129
The demand for race neutrality oversimplifies the practical task
before the University in Fisher. The University's choice is not simply
between a race-neutral and race-based admissions process. Rather,
the choice is also one between individualized admissions and more
formulaic ones. No doubt, the University could have achieved or approximated its desired level of diversity through race-neutral measures. It could have enrolled its entire entering class through a top
eleven percent plan rather than the Top Ten Percent Plan. But an
eleven percent plan would have eliminated the University's ability to
exercise its professional judgment in actually picking any of the students in its class. This is important because it would also deprive the
University of the ability to ensure that it rounded out its entering class
with multifaceted diversity. A top eleven percent plan would have
achieved geographic and racial diversity, but may have eliminated or
under enrolled other types.
Dissenting in Grutter,Justice Thomas had made an analogous argument. He posited that Michigan Law School could have achieved
diversity by doing away with its "elite" admissions standards and individualized review.130 In its place, the law school could have admitted
students based upon, for instance, the completion of some minimum
core curriculum prior to law school, or through a lottery among minimally qualified applicants. 1 3 ' The majority rejected this option as being no real option at all because it forced the University to choose
between a nuanced admission process designed to achieve multiple
objectives that were part of its mission and a mechanical admissions
process that might achieve diversity, but would eliminate other relevant considerations and goals. Presumably, the majority appreciated
that although race played a formal role in the law schools' admissions,
its functional effect was minimal in comparison to the fundamental
functional change that removing race would work in admissions.132
128. Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2420.
129. See id. at 2421 ("The District Court and Court of Appeals confined the strict scrutiny
inquiry in too narrow a way by deferring to the University's good faith in its use of racial classifications and affirming the grant of summary judgment on that basis.").
130. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 368-69.
131. See id. at 340.
132. A similar quandary existed in Parents Involved. The student assignment places were
both choice and race-based. But without some use of race, a choice-based program could make
segregation worse rather than better. Without choice, a race-based assignment plan would have
been unpopular. Without question, the district could have engaged in various types of race-
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What the Court missed in Fisher, ironically, the Texas public
seemed to appreciate on some fundamental level. When the state first
adopted the Top Ten Percent Plan, it was not without its critics.13 3 In
fact, the Plan proved very controversial in the most privileged, whitest
areas of the state. 134 In the past, privileged families in Texas had
grown accustomed to their children gaining admission to the University of Texas (or at least having a stronger chance). With higher average SAT scores, they had a far better chance of admission than
students in high-poverty, racially segregated schools, as well as rural
students, who had graduated at the top of their high school classes. 3 5
The Top Ten Percent Plan significantly lowered the odds of admission
for students from these privileged areas and schools, so much so that
some families tried to game the system by transferring to a disadvantaged school prior to applying to college.136 The opposition to the Top
Ten Percent Plan was strong enough that, at one point, there was serious talk of repealing or shrinking it.137
Without conceding the Court is prescient in its elevation of form
over function, it is important to acknowledge that dropping racial
forms following Hopwood may have had a positive effect. The Top
Ten Percent Plan survived politically in the face of opposition, and
may have done so only because race had been removed from the process. This paved the way for the state to engage in a broader discussion of fairness. Racial diversity motivations aside, the state's Top Ten
Percent Plan represents an evolved sense of merit and fairness. It assesses merit based on past achievement in regard to a student's immediate peers. This comparison is important because immediate peers
neutral mandatory assignments that would have integrated the schools. But those plans would
have been pilloried. See Parents Involved in Comm. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S.
701, 701-04 (2007). Thus, a flaw in Justice Kennedy's opinion is the failure to appreciate how
the plans really work. Instead, he simply assesses "how they look" in terms of the uses of race
that they relied upon. See id. at 782, 787.
133. See Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2432.
134. See Rebecca Leung, Is the "Top 10" Plan Unfair?, CBS NEWS (Oct. 15 2004), http://
www.cbsnews.com/8301-18560_162-649704.html.
135. See Scott Jaschik, Texas Limits "10% " Admissions, INSIDE HIGHER ED (June 1, 2009),
http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2009/06/01/texas.
136. See Leung, supra note 134.
137. See id. Although the state did not eliminate the policy, there was sufficient pressure to
cap it. State law now limits the number of students admitted under the policy to no more than
seventy-five percent of the total undergraduate admissions for that year. Thus, the exact effects
of the policy will now vary from year to year. In 2011, for instance, there was only room for the
top eight percent of graduating seniors. See The University of Texas at Austin to Automatically
Admit Top 8 Percentof High School Graduatesfor 2011, U. OF TEX. AT AUSTIN (Sept. 16,2009),
http://www.utexas.edu/news/2009/09/16/top8_percent/.
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are more similarly situated than peers somewhere on the other side of
the state. Thus, this comparison permits a more innate assessment of
applicants.
The Top Ten Percent Plan also represents an acknowledgment
that the University of Texas and other leading public institutions in
the state are not private institutions open only to the privileged class.
Rather, these state institutions should be open to and serve the state's
entire population. Once the explicit consideration of race was out and
the Top Ten Percent Plan in, the University was also confronted with a
situation where admissions slots were scarce. If the University was
truly committed to creating opportunity for the "best" or most "worthy" students, it needed to engage in a serious evaluation of merit.
The final determination of how to do this was to refrain from evaluating raw SAT and GPA scores in a vacuum and, instead, to evaluate
them in the context of a student's life chances and obstacles. Analogous arguments about proportional representation and merit could
and have been made in regard to race, but those arguments are more
easily cut short by labeling the proposals as racial quota systems,
stereotypical,1 3 9 and/or essentialist.14 0 Thus, removing race as an explicit factor was likely a key factor in the state's willingness to adopt
what amounts to a proportional or quota system based on geography-a proportional system that now better serves the collective people of Texas. Only by first envisioning merit and personal
achievement in broader non-racial terms than it ever had before could
the University later come back to defend race as a relevant consideration not just to diversity, but to merit and achievement.
None of this is to say that form over function is the legally appropriate principle. Racial forms have political salience that can overwhelm the fair consideration of an issue and, for this reason, removing
racial forms from the conversation can have practical value. It does
not follow, however, that race neutrality alone will necessarily lead to
desirable outcomes. To the contrary, the facially neutral Top Ten Percent Plan may have never occurred without affirmative action advocates pressing for a work-around to ensure diversity. Disentangling
these two factors and assigning preeminence to either is likely impossible. The Court in Fisher, nonetheless, comes down strong on the
side of legal limitations on racial forms, regardless of their function.
138. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 414-15 (1978).
139. See, e.g., Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 799, 800, 828 (1st Cir. 1998).
140. See DELGADO & STEFANIC, supra note 118, at 62-65.
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III. WHEN STATE ACTORS INTENTIONALLY
OBSCURE RACE
The Court's form over function approach extends beyond affirmative action cases. One might assume workarounds in affirmative action and, thus, discount the impact of the approach there. But in
other contexts, racial justice advocates have fewer alternatives and the
impact of the Court's approach has far more practical impact than
affirmative action ever has. Most notable is the Court's contraction of
causes of action for disparate impact and its adoption of an intent
standard as the touchstone of racial discrimination in nearly every
statutory and constitutional context.
The Court's first opinion to adopt the intent standard as a generally applicable standard was Washington v. Davis.14 ' There, the Court
held that intent was necessary to establish an Equal Protection violation under the Fifth Amendment.1 42 The Court followed Davis with
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development

Corporation,in which the Court held that the same standard applies
to the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.14 3
More recently, the Court adopted the intent standard for Title VI of
the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 in Alexander v. Sandoval.144 Title VI
regulates discrimination in all programs-private and public-that receive federal funding. Thus, its reach is broader than the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments.
All of these cases involved facially race-neutral policies that exacted huge practical tolls on minorities, but because none included a
crucial racial form, none invoked the Court's skepticism and scrutiny.
In Davis, the City of Washington, D.C., had adopted a written exam
that disproportionately excluded minorities from the opportunity to
become a police officer. 14 5 The exam, however, had not been shown
to relate to job performance.146 In Village of Arlington Heights, the
Village, a suburb outside of Chicago, had experienced significant population growth, but that growth was almost entirely white.14 7 Data
141. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). Davis cited Keyes v. Denver School District No.1, 413 U.S. 189
(1973), as having first adopted the intent standard, but Keyes's reliance on intent was more
nuanced and also allowed for workarounds through a presumption of intent.
142. See id. at 240.
143. See 429 U.S. 252, 268 (1977).
144. See 532 U.S. 275, 281 (2001).
145. Davis, 426 U.S. at 234-36.
146. Id.
147. See Vill. of Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 260.
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showed that only twenty-seven of the Village's 64,000 residents were
African American. 14 8 When a proposal to develop low and middleincome housing that would have drawn more minorities to the area
came before the Village's housing authority, it denied the proposal.1 49
In Sandoval, the state of Alabama refused to administer its driver's
license examination in any language other than English, the negative
impact of which was felt almost exclusively by ethnic minorities. 5 o
In each of these cases, the policies in question had far greater
racial impacts than any of the admissions policies at issue in Gratz,
Grutter, Parents Involved or Fisher. The screening exam in Davis

worked to limit the most visible and powerful aspect of local government from reflecting the community it served, which was particularly
important to the community given the police department's historical
role in oppressing African Americans.1 s' The facially neutral zoning
policies in Arlington Heights maintained an entire political subdivision
as a white enclave, notwithstanding the diversity of the overall metropolitan area.152 The English-only policy in Sandoval had almost no
effect on whites (or African Americans), whereas ethnic minorities,
particularly the newly emerging Latino population in the state, felt a
significant impact.'
In contrast, in Fisherand Grutter, the limited and holistic consideration of race only tipped the scales for a subset of minority applicants. Thus, whites continued to receive the predominant percentage
of admissions and, as a group, were significantly advantaged by
processes that heavily weighted factors like the SAT and LSAT.' 5 4
Likewise, the evidence in Parents Involved showed that race only infrequently played a decisive role in student assignments.155 In general, the process worked to the advantage of both whites and
minorities, as it afforded them the opportunity to select and gain admission to their school of choice independent of race. These minimal
148. Id. at 255.
149. See id. at 256-58.
150. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 279 (2001).
151. See generally Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987) (discussing the cultural meaning of
excluding minorities from the police force).
152. Interpreting Neighborhood Change in Chicago, CUPPA, http://www.uic.edulcuppa/
voorheesctr/Gentrification%20Index%2OSite/Main%2ONeighborhood%20Change%20Revised.
htm (last visited Jan. 25, 2014).
153. See Sandoval v. Hagan, 197 F.3d 484, 489-90(11th Cir. 1999).
154. See generally SAT WARS, supra note 119 (discussing the socioeconomic bias of the
SAT).
155. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 723 (2007).
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impacts, nonetheless, were subjected to the strictest of scrutiny and
placed in serious jeopardy simply because they relied on racial forms.
Whereas, in the absence of racial forms in Davis, Arlington Heights,
and Sandoval, significant, if not extreme, racial impacts went unchecked. By placing so much weight on the presence or absence of
racial forms, the Court severely discounts the importance of the contexts in which the forms arise, the result of which is judicial doctrine
disconnected from reality and susceptible to obfuscation.
The intent standard is not the exact equivalent of a racial form
standard because intentional discrimination can occur in the absence
of a racial form, but, in practice, the intent standard amounts to a
form standard. It is premised on historical discrimination, which was
open, obvious, and explicit-in other words, formal-and presupposes
a particular state of mind on the part of the discriminatory actor: a
conscious or malevolent desire to disadvantage based on race. 5 As
the Court in Personnel Administrators of Massachusetts v. Feeney15 7

explained, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant "selected
or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part 'because of,'
not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable
group."1 5 With such a legal standard in place and the social unacceptability of obvious racism, state actors do not dare enact or rely on
racial forms that would disadvantage minorities.' 5 9 In fact, most state
actors are presumably well-intentioned and may not consciously intend to disadvantage minorities." Subconscious biases, however, do
disadvantage minorities and generally escape judicial review under intentional discrimination standards.161 The net result is an intentional
discrimination standard that does little to address racial inequality in
the absence of a racial form, or its conscious equivalent in the mind of
the state actor.16 2
Treating racial forms or intent as the touchstone of discrimination
has the added problem of incentivizing state actors to obfuscate their
156. See generally Michael Selmi, Proving IntentionalDiscrimination:The Reality of Supreme
Court Rhetoric, 86 GEO. L.J. 279, 335 (1997) (discussing the Court's difficulty in shifting from a
"segregation mentality").
157. Personnel Adm'rs of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
158. Id. at 279.
159. See DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW Xix-xxii, 1 (6th ed. 2008).
160. See Lawrence, supra note 151, at 322.
161. See id.; Selmi, supra note 156, at 288.
162. See Derek W. Black, The Contradiction Between Equal Protection's Meaning and Its
Legal Substance: How Deliberate Indifference Can Cure It, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 533,

572-75 (2006).
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motives to avoid judicial scrutiny. If a community like the Village of
Arlington Heights is inclined to keep minorities out, identifying a legitimate non-discrimination goal to achieve this end is relatively easy.
Although a non-discriminatory explanation may be pretextual, victims
face a heavy burden in ferreting out the hidden agenda with hard evidence. Therein lays the irony. A well-intentioned school district
might make minimal use of explicit racial categories to integrate
schools, but if it does, the district will face an uphill battle in defending
its policies. In contrast, a district that wants to maintain racially isolated schools can obfuscate its motives and assert an interest in neighborhood schools. Absent Freudian slips or poor judgment, it is highly
unlikely that a court would find the policy racially discriminatory. To
put it bluntly, form over function allows segregation on a national
scale while impeding integration even in the narrowest of circumstances at the local level.
The same principle applies to higher education. Recognizing this,
the well-intentioned but rational university may now have the same
obfuscation motivation as the biased or malevolent actor. If universities actualize their motivations, the Supreme Court may have succeeded in ridding higher education admissions of racial forms, but it
will not have rid the racial inequality and discrimination that necessitated race-conscious measures in the first instance. Rather, the primary effect will have been to stymie those that sought to counteract
inequality and .discrimination, and prompt the most committed
progressives to act in the same shadows as their opponents.
CONCLUSION
On its surface, the Court's opinion in Fisher v. Texas borders on
irrelevant. It announced no new doctrine. At best, it emphasized that
lower courts must pay close attention to evidence regarding the preexisting standard requiring the consideration of race-neutral alternatives. But below the surface, the case evidences a continued and
growing infatuation with formalistic reasoning that largely ignores
real-world impacts. The majority of the Court believes that, if we
could just redact racial classifications-even benign ones-from our
policies, race would soon enough leave our minds, and real-world inequality would follow the same course. The Court may have a point.
In certain contexts, removing race from a policy debate may offer
some benefit because its presence so easily distracts us from fair and
reasoned thought. But it does not follow that race classifications are
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themselves the problem. Rather, it is our ineptness in dealing with
race that is often the problem. Even when excised from explicit conversation and policy, the issues and problems of race lie right beneath
the surface and require solutions. Unfortunately, rigid formalistic reasoning has, thus far, proved unsuited to provide such solutions.
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